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 In this study we focus on three historical concepts of using of 
mathematical approach to beauty and aesthetic (taste) standard of 
mathematical thinking in early formation of modern aesthetics of the 
eighteenth century. The first is Hume’s idea of statistical standardization and 
the significance of rareness and excellence, as a desire for specific positive 
deviation. Second model of aesthetic thinking is Reid’s aesthetic realism. In 
this theory of taste and art the attention is paid to the study of the parameters 
and attributes of objects, as well as to the fact that a beautiful object contains 
cognitively significant information. Those who perceive it are, or should be, 
able to deal with and understand this information. Important part of these 
considerations is the analysis of ontological status of beauty and the term of 
excellence. In the conclusion of this study, we try to highlight the 
mathematical algorithm of aesthetic standards creation and ideal in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment. We attempt to suggest the potential of all three 
approaches in contemporary scientific cognitive aesthetic research. 
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Introduction 
 Beauty and options for its research represent an ancient philosophical 
issue, combining not only questions of methodology, but also a significant 
number of metaphysical questions and obstacles. One of those essential 
questions is definitely: what is beauty and is it possible to objectively 
examine beauty? If yes, then how? 
 This study tries to describe three historical approaches to continuity 
and the mathematization of beauty, which can be identified in the analyses of 
beauty in the period when aesthetics was formed as an independent 
philosophical field, and which can be observed in approach to the 
mathematics of aesthetic experience research even today. 
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 The very first and essential approach to this field is Hume’s 
“mathematization” of taste and his search for objective aesthetic standards. 
 
Hume and Standardization of Standards of Taste 
 If we are to understand Hume's work Of the Standard of Taste1, we 
have to take into account, that for the British school2 taste is one of the key 
human intellectual skills3. Aesthetics, labelled Criticism in Hume's 
nomenclature, could have become a Newton-type science if the subject of its 
research had been the analysis of mind patterns, the ways in which we think 
or the ways in which we perceive beautiful things and how our mind 
processes information in this regard. However, some philosophers associated 
taste with rational skills and a certain natural skill of judgment. As an 
empiricist, Hume believed that the only way to examine this skill – 
undoubtedly interesting and important in everyday life – is through 
experience and observation. It could be either introspection, analysing one’s 
own experience of beauty, or it could be an objectification of the aesthetic 
experience of other individuals. 
 Hume was aware that the perception of beauty was connected to 
sensibility under the influence of Lockean epistemology and Hutchenson’s 
aesthetics. His sensualism results in the fact that the subject of an aesthetic 
judgment is not something external, but, on the contrary, the impression we 
perceive as subjects. Therefore, the quality of our perception is not the 
quality of the object. That leads to polemics regarding the nature of 
secondary qualities. 
 Similar to Berkeley, Hume believed that taste judgment, the 
attribution of qualities to objects, is a result of rational generalization and 
abstraction. However, it can often be incorrect. That, which is infallible and 
true, is our perception. Therefore, if we claim that some object is beautiful, 
we cross the boundary of sensual experience and emotion in our judgment 
                                                          
1Humes’s essay Of the Standard of Taste is an elaboration of his ideas from An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals and was issued as a part of Four Dissertations 
(together with the essay Of Tragedy) in 1757. It is also a reaction to the decision of the 
Edinburgh Society for Encouraging Arts, Sciences, Manufacturers and Agriculture in 
Scotland, which awarded the essay of Alexander Gerard „Dialogue on Taste“ with the title 
of “best essay on taste” in 1755 (Hume was a member along with Adam Smith, Lord 
Kames, William Robertson, Alan Ramsay and Adam Ferguson) which was issued together 
with three similar dissertations by Voltaire, d’Alembert and Montesquieu in the seventh 
volume of Encyclopédie in 1759 after Hume’s prompting (compare: Jones 2011, 431 – 432). 
2After Shaftesbury, its main proponents were F. Hutcheson, G. Turbull, J. Harris, W. 
Hogarth, E. Burke, A. Gerard, H. Home - lord Kames, A. Smith, J. Beattie, J. Reynolds, T. 
Reid, A. Alison, D. Stewart and D. Hume. 
3In the introduction to his Treatise, Hume states four basic disciplines – philosophical fields 
(logic, morals, criticism and politics), describing the mind and its abilities or researching the 
phenomena that are connected to these skills (compare: Hume 2012, s. 6 – 7). 
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and we attribute qualities to something that we might perceive incorrectly. 
Emotion (opinion, impression) is the only real and epistemically infallible 
thing and thus taste judgments should apply only to perception. “Among a 
thousand different opinions which different men may entertain of the same 
subject, there is one, and but one, that is just and true; and the only difficulty 
is to fix and ascertain it. On the contrary, a thousand different sentiments, 
excited by the same object, are all right: Because no sentiment represents 
what is really in the object. It only marks a certain conformity or relation 
between the object and the organs or faculties of the mind; and if that 
conformity did not really exist, the sentiment could never possibly have 
being” (Hume, 2008, 136). The subject of our thoughts should be thus 
perception and a certain taste psychology. According to Hume, the ontology 
of beauty is (referring to Shakespeare's Beauty is in the eye of beholder) a 
matter of impression, it “is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in 
the mind which contemplates them [...]” (Hume, 2008, 136). 
 It thus seems that aesthetics are based on perceptions and therefore 
there is a risk that it must be fundamentally subjective and relative. The 
reason why it is so lies in the fact that we do not have receptors that are 
developed at the same level of sensitivity, or they might be contaminated and 
thus the resulting perceptions can be very different. In addition, we are also 
very different in the question of preference, and thus “each mind perceives a 
different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, where another is 
sensible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own 
sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others.” (Hume, 2008, 
137). Can a science about beauty and the “pleasant” even exist? Or can we 
only provide descriptions of our own subjective emotions? 
 If Hume wanted to give succour to aesthetics as a science, the 
judgments of which could claim objective validity, he could opt for at least 
two solutions. He partially opted for both. The first solution was the analysis 
of “beautiful”, that is, the thing which beautiful emotions and the objects that 
cause them have in common. 
 Hume (2008, 134-135) realized that despite the indisputable diversity 
of our tastes, it is possible to find objects and crafts that appeal to almost 
everybody in various observation contexts within history and across cultures. 
These classics are beautiful because our subjective tastes probably have 
something in common. The “Statistical intersection” of individual tastes 
could be a solution to the search for a potential general taste if it exists, or at 
least general attributes of what we like. It is obvious from the nature of his 
epistemology that what we like are not the objects themselves4, but the 
                                                          
4“Though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated to give 
pleasure, it is not to be expected, that in every individual the pleasure will be equally felt.” 
(Hume, 2008, 140). 
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structure or form of our emotions. And thus we have to rivet our attention to 
them. However, Hume does not analyse “beautiful” objects by means of 
certain phenomenology of the perception of appealing objects, that is, what 
we experience when we like something, or through the intersection of 
attributes of objects we perceive as “beautiful”, and not even through of our 
desires (for what purpose do we like something?) when we like something. 
He pays attention to another aspect of the subjective perception of beauty – 
its atypicality and excellence5 in comparison to other, up until that point, 
aesthetically neutral objects. 
 The term excellence is to philosophy, special. On one hand, 
excellence is everything which is not common, that is rare. And thus our 
preferences in perceiving various aesthetic objects can be rare. Hume is 
aware that there are individuals who might like things which others do not 
like or even that disgust them. He assumes that this anomaly in taste could be 
caused by sickness or an individual oddity. Individual anomalies in taste are 
more likely to be an error than the standard. Hume expects that the majority 
would reject such an unusual taste judgment because it is in contrast to a 
certain generally accepted standards of perception. And here is the core of 
the issue. We consider everything which is excellent to be beautiful, 
however, this excellence is considered (or might be considered) beautiful by 
the majority of those who perceive it. It seems that our nature forces us to 
search for generally accepted standards of perception in our judgments 
(Hume 2008, 136). The question is: does such a standard even exist and how 
are these aesthetic standards established? 
 We believe that Hume’s fundamentals of aesthetic judgment are more 
or less mathematical. Hume assumes that perceptual standards as well as 
standards of taste really do exist. He documents it by the statement that “If, 
in the sound state of the organ, there be an entire or a considerable 
uniformity of sentiment among men, we may thence derive an idea of the 
perfect beauty; [...]” (Hume 2008, 140). The idea of beauty could therefore 
be derived statistically from the unity of feeling of pleasure in the perception 
of the same object by different individuals, “in like manner as the 
appearance of objects in day-light, to the eye of a man in health, is 
denominated their true and real colour, even while colour is allowed to be 
merely a phantasm of the senses” (Hume 2008, 140). But in what manner are 
the aesthetic standards established? 
 Regarding the famous example of Sancho Panza tasting wine, it is 
obvious that our taste is standardized by practice and the quantity of 
observations. Even individual taste is, in fact, a result of the standardization 
                                                          
5Hume uses the term excellence in two meanings. Firstly, it conveys rareness – 
uncommonness as an opposite to usualness (standard). Secondly, it conveys rareness in the 
sense of perfection. 
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of judgments. If the inexperienced individual is to deal with some notion, he 
compares it with the notions he has already experienced and therefore his 
individual taste might differ from that of others. “A man, who has had no 
opportunity to compare different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally 
unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to 
him. By comparison alone we fix the epithets of praise or blame, and learn 
how to assign the due degree of each.” (Hume 2008, 140). Therefore, our 
perception is a standardization of our experiences. Our scale for beautiful 
and ugly develops with a quantity of material “already perceived”. We 
consider beautiful, those things, which are not average and in this manner 
they meet or even exceed the established standards. This is just the first part 
of Hume’s solution – the less visible one. The second one is the 
standardization of tastes between individuals. 
 If our experience is limited to only some types of objects, it is 
obvious that our taste will be determined and limited by this particularly 
narrow experience. This is valid for each individual and therefore by sharing 
aesthetic experiences and taste judgments (and comparing them!), it is 
possible to rectify the individual taste and thus it is possible to establish 
generic taste and aesthetic feelings for a community or nation on the same 
principles of comparison and standardization. The standardization of 
standards of taste is therefore done on an individual as well as an inter-
individual level by the same means. 
 It could seem that the result of such standardization would, in the 
end, be an average of the aesthetic judgments. However, we would only face 
this situation if each person had completely different individual aesthetic 
judgments. The truth is that we like the same things, thanks to various – for 
instance historical or social – influences. Thus, Hume believes that beauty is 
everything that exceeds the standard and therefore (like the Gaussian 
distribution of intelligence and genius) everything which is (positively) 
perceived as rare, not only by a single individual, but also by a group of 
observers. The inter-subjective taste is formed by a process of 
standardization and synchronization of individual tastes. Practice, education 
and expert opinions play a vital role in this process. 
 Hume’s philosophy is often criticized because his definition of taste, 
as stated by experts – critics – is circular (Guyer 2014, 129; Broadie 2010, 
289). However, considering previous thoughts, it is obvious that the 
relevance of any taste judgment is dependent on the level of experience of 
the person who perceives it. According to Hume, the opinions of critics are 
more authoritative than the opinions of inexperienced or partially 
experienced individuals. Although it would be sufficient, this is not caused 
only by the expertise of the critic in his field and having incomparably more 
experience in it and therefore better overview of the matter. The greater and 
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more diverse set of aesthetic experiences the critic has, the more reliable his 
judgment is. 
 The second important factor of Hume’s preferences in experts’ 
opinions lies in the subtlety and education they use in their judgments. Hume 
presents the example of the perception and judgment of flavours (Hume 
2008, 142). It is clear that almost everybody is able to identify the significant 
and common flavours. However, the critic is able to identify not only the rare 
and uncommon ingredients, but he can also sense them with greater (or 
greatest) subtlety. It is the subtlety and the ability to distinguish that is 
necessary for taste relevancy and expertize. The subtle senses and 
imagination are given by physiology as well as by education and practice. 
 The task of the experts, for authoritative opinions, is not only to 
classify and organize our experiences, but for their experiences and subtlety 
to also compensate for our missing individual experiences, which we are 
unable to perceive due to our absence of subtle receptors or imagination. 
Thanks to the value of their experience, our individual standard of 
experience becomes closer to the expert’s standard. We believe that 
somewhere here (in these mathematical evaluations of individual experience 
with the experience of experts) lies the source of Kant’s ability to distinguish 
between high and low art and the experts’ task for the development of taste. 
 
Thomas Reid and Mathematization of Objects 
 According to Gordon Graham (2014, 225), Hume’s theory of taste 
expects that our perception of beauty is firstly the expression of emotions, 
subsequently processed by rational judgments. Beauty is thus something 
sensed and a domain of emotions. Thomas Reid opposed Hume’s 
epistemology and assumed that our perception is not the perception of 
emotions, but rather of objects. His epistemological approach is that of a 
direct realism, influencing his understanding of beauty. Reid does not 
understand beauty as an expression of emotions originating from notions, but 
as a real quality of objects which we perceive. “When a beautiful object is 
before us, we may distinguish the agreeable emotion it produces in us from 
the quality of the object which causes that emotion. When I hear an air in 
music that pleases me, I say it is fine, it is excellent. This excellence is not in 
me; it is in the music. But the pleasure it gives is not in the music; it is in 
me.” (Reid, 1969, 754). He believes that the subjects of our aesthetic 
evaluation are directly real objects with which we deal by means of 
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perception. And so the beauty is not in the eye of the beholder6, but rather 
directly in the object7. 
 Reid’s aesthetic realism implied another possible approach to the 
study of beauty and beautiful objects – the analysis and mathematization of 
the parameters of a beautiful object itself. As he states, “The sense of beauty 
may be analysed in a manner very similar to the sense of sweetness. It is an 
agreeable feeling or emotion, accompanied with an opinion or judgment of 
some excellence in the object, which is fitted by nature to produce that 
feeling. The feeling is, no doubt, in the mind, and so also in the judgment that 
we form of the object; but this judgment, like all others, must be true or false. 
If it be a true judgment, then there is some real excellence in the object.” 
(Reid 1969, 599). The sensation of beauty is produced by the qualities of the 
object and thus beauty can be observed by focusing on qualities like rarity 
and perfection8. 
 But what is rarity? We assume that in dealing with it, a certain 
mathematical quality is involved. The fact that a specific object is rare9 is 
based on our ability to deal with its qualities and to compare it with other 
objects and to come to the conclusion that it is not average or common. Thus 
rarity presupposes it is uncommon. According to Reid, rarity itself is a 
natural standard of beauty. Namely, beauty itself is rare. Reid is aware of 
beauty’s diverse forms and that they very often differ from one another, but 
their uniqueness and exclusivity connects them despite all their differences. 
It is not just any type of uniqueness, however. At the same time, beautiful 
things are perfect in their form. While exclusivity presupposes only the 
ability for statistical calculations between the common and extraordinary, 
perfection presupposes yet another type of calculation – a determination of a 
certain inner proportionality, harmony, symmetry and completeness. But 
there is still the question of which specific attributes are those that 
characterize the perfection and excellence of the object. 
 While it is possible to find several opinions on the matter of the 
ability to differentiate between the separate attributes of the qualities that 
                                                          
6For discussion of certain obstacles to Reid’s aesthetic realism see: Jaffro 2008. 
7Reid thus clearly opposed Hutchenson’s subjectivist aesthetics stating “there is no beauty in 
any object whatsoever; it is only a sensation or feeling in the person that perceives it.” 
(Reid 1969, 755). 
8Jaffro suggests that Reid’s aesthetics contain another two interesting levels of research of 
beauty besides the examination of the qualities of the objects: perception and our natural 
ability to perceive beauty. We assume that the core of Hume’s essay on taste lies in the 
perception of the pleasant, and the analysis of our ability granted by Nature is a metaphor of 
foundations of Kant’s research of beauty, as we will show later on (compare Jaffro 2008, 
136). 
9Similarly to Shaftesbury, Reid suggests three kinds of aesthetic qualities. Contrary to him, 
however, he prefers novelty, magnificence and beauty (compare Guyer 2014, 221). 
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cause the perception of affection in the history of aesthetics, Reid’s approach 
is clear, at least in terms of their existence. Reid believes that as in the same 
way that we cannot equate colour with the idea when we think of it, colour in 
fact is the physical quality of a thing that causes our idea of colour, beauty is 
a real quality of a subject that causes affection in those who perceive it. As 
far as having knowledge of it is concerned, though, he is more reserved and 
states that “in objects that please our taste, we always judge that there is 
some real excellence, some superiority to those that do not please us. In 
some cases, that superior excellence is distinctly perceived, and can be 
pointed out; in other cases, we have only a general notion of some excellence 
which we cannot describe.” (Reid 1969, 760). Therefore, Reid believes that 
certain attributes, which make objects beautiful, can be clearly identified10. 
This specific approach is the method of choice for a part of cognitive 
aesthetics11. 
 
Kant and the Cognitive Basics of Aesthetic Judgment? The Idea of 
Standard and Mathematical Composition 
 Reid’s attribution of cognitive aspects to aesthetic judgments seems 
to be in contrast with Kant’s requirement for intellectual purity in aesthetic 
judgment. Kant is considered to be a philosopher who rejects any rational 
interventions in taste judgments12. Pure aesthetic judgment is a matter of 
reflective judgment (in contrast to a defining one) which is deprived of terms 
or intellectual purposes. 
 If we look into Kant’s thesis about beauty and ideal, we will come to 
the conclusion that the idea of beauty is a rational and the ideal is a vision 
identical with this. But how do we come to the ideal of beauty? A priori or 
empirically? 
 In his Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests a notable psychological 
explanation: “Notice how in a manner wholly beyond our grasp our 
imagination is able on occasion not only to recall, even from the distant past, 
the signs that stand for concepts, but also to reproduce [an] object's image 
and shape from a vast number of objects of different kinds or even of one and 
the same kind. Moreover, all indications suggest that this power, when the 
mind wants to make comparisons, can actually proceed as follows, though 
                                                          
10“A work of art may appear beautiful to the most ignorant, even to a child. It pleases, but he 
knows not why. To one who understands it perfectly, and perceives how every part is fitted 
with exact judgment to its end, the beauty is not mysterious; it is perfectly comprehended; 
and he knows wherein it consists, as well as how it affects him.” (Reid 1969, 574). 
11In the case of music, we identify its beauty in expression, in the beauty of melody and in 
the beauty of harmony (Kivy 2010, 274). 
12On the other hand, he preferred the thesis of beauty’s role in mathematics until 1790, 
however, he later rejected it (compare Wenzel 2001). 
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this process does not reach consciousness: the imagination projects, as it 
were, one image onto another, and from the congruence of most images of 
the same kind it arrives at an average that serves as the common standard 
for all of them” (Kant 1987, 82). What is more, from the image of the 
standard origin of a handsome man’s stature, Kant specifies in his analysis of 
the origin of the standard idea: “Someone has seen a thousand adult men. If 
now he wishes to make a judgment about their standard size, to be estimated 
by way of a comparison, then (in my opinion) the imagination projects a 
large number of the images (perhaps the entire thousand) onto one another. 
If I may be permitted to illustrate this by an analogy from optics: in the 
space where most of the images are united and within the outline where the 
area is illuminated by the colour applied most heavily, there the average size 
emerges, equally distant in both height and breadth from the outermost 
bounds of the tallest and shortest in stature; and that is the stature for a 
beautiful man” (Kant 1987, 82). 
 Therefore, the standard idea originates from an unconscious 
mathematical calculation. The unconsciousness is documented not only by 
the mentioned conviction about the real comparison (though insufficient for 
the consciousness), but also by Kant’s note that “The same result could be 
obtained mechanically, by measuring the entire thousand, adding up 
separately all their heights and their breadths (and thicknesses) by 
themselves and then dividing each sum by a thousand. And yet the 
imagination does just that by means of a dynamic effect arising from its 
multiple perception of such shapes on the organ of the inner sense” (Kant 
1987, 82). It could be said that this act is carried out intuitively with an 
unspoken algorithm for the solution (Démuth 2009). However, Kant clearly 
unfolds this mathematical algorithm. Our creation of aesthetic standards is 
tied to mathematical operations of which we are unaware because they are 
performed by the imagination. 
 Nevertheless, the significant issue is whether it is done on the basis of 
previous experiences (as suggested by Hume) or a priori. Although Kant 
states that the creation of the ideal is determined by previous experience 
(according to Kant, the Chinese ideal is different to the European one) based 
on the perceptions that one might encounter in his or her environment. This 
fact is valid not only for the standards of human physique, but for all 
aesthetic standards and patterns (for instance the standards of horses, dogs, 
etc). On the other hand, at the same time he says that “this standard ideal is 
not derived from proportions that are taken from experience as determinate 
rules. Rather, it is in accordance with this ideal that rules for judgment 
become possible in the first place” (Kant 1975, 73). The creation of an 
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algorithm of aesthetic standards probably takes place a priori13, but its 
material is obtained by experience. 
 Nevertheless, there is Kant’s other remarkable note, “the standard 
idea is by no means the entire archetype of beauty within this kind but is only 
the form… Nor is it because of its beauty that we like its exhibition, but 
merely because it does not contradict any of the conditions under which a 
thing of this kind can be beautiful” (Kant 1987, 82). What is more, he 
suggests an example in a footnote: “It will be found that a perfectly regular 
face, such as a painter would like to have as a model, usually conveys 
nothing. This is because it contains nothing characteristic and hence 
expresses more the idea of [human] kind than what is specific in one person” 
(Kant 1987, 82). However, as the numerous observations of psychologists 
and cognitive scientists show, people perceive faces that are the closest to 
Kant’s described average as a standard of beauty as beautiful. This 
knowledge has been well-known since the times of Galton and his almost 
Kantian experiment with the composite images of criminals who were more 
attractive than the faces of individuals, but it was proved by repeated 
observations carried out by Langloas and Roggman (1990) and by many 
others (Perrett 2010, Rhodes 1998, 1999...). The explanation of why we like 
faces which are close to or identical to faces created according to the Kantian 
standard is not only mathematical, but also evolutionary. However, the fact 
remains that throughout the history of art (for instance in the Baroque period) 
opinions can be found that for “perfection”, the perfectly average and 
symmetrical face very often requires the violation of symmetry and the 
average by means of a certain beauty spot which would make the object 
distinctive and unforgettable. 
 Kant’s theory of the ideal paradoxically represents (concerning the 
overall anti-cognitivism of Kant’s aesthetic judgment) a model of the 
creation of aesthetic standards and ideals by acquiring composite individual 
experience. Kant thus offered a potential insight into the unexplored secrets 
of cognitive aesthetics, into the creation of algorithms of aesthetic experience 
and judgments. The applicability of this approach is documented not only by 
numerous studies by contemporary cognitive psychologists and aesthetics, 
but also by the evolutionary reflection of the significance of beauty for the 
individual from the point of view of a beautiful object’s participation in the 
creation of an ideal or type norm and the issues connected with it. At the 
same time, he made it possible to consider aesthetic experiences as a 
dynamic mathematical operation, which allows him to extend his views to 
other fields of perception and thought. 
  
                                                          
13Similar to “A judgment of taste rests on a priori bases” (Kant 1987, 67-68). 
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